October issue 2006

Though President Musharraf’s latest sojourn to the United States may have reinforced his status as America’s favourite dictator, his standing as a credible leader has hit a new low. During his inordinately long stay in New York, for the United Nations’ General Assembly session, and to promote his newly published autobiography, Musharraf became the focus of an unprecedented media blitz, even appearing on Jon Stewart’s “Daily Show,” a satirical evening news programme — the first head of state to do so. For America, Musharraf remains an ally of convenience, at least in the war against Al- Qaeda.

But his credibility, as a man who can be trusted, has been critically exposed when confronted with the paradox between his rhetoric and reality. His efforts to promote himself as a standard bearer in the fight against Islamic extremism fell flat in the face of his policies at home.

Over the seven years since he seized power, in what he often describes as ” counter-coup,” Musharraf has turned into a crafty politician. The dramatic turn of events in the aftermath of 9/11 had thrown him to the centre of international politics, as the head of a front-line state in the US war on terror. From an international outcast for his support to the Taliban and the man who facilitated jihadi networks, Musharraf became a key partner in the US strategy in the region. Musharraf has thrived in his new found status, but his position is becoming increasingly tenuous as he walks a thin line between his support for the US and his government’s continuing links with the Islamists.

Musharraf’s chutzpah was on full display when he cited Talibanisation as a bigger threat than Al-Qaeda during his three-week-long trip to Europe and the United States. “The west may have missed a shift in the ‘center of gravity’ of terrorism, from Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda to the Taliban,” he warned in his speech before the European Parliament in Brussels. ” The real danger…lies in the emergence and further strengthening of the Taliban,” he said.

Ironically, his pronouncement came just a week after Pakistani authorities signed a controversial truce agreement, ending a three-year-long military campaign against the militants in troubled North Waziristan. On paper, the military’s deal was with the “tribal leaders,” but in effect it has empowered the local Taliban who have been actively involved in the insurgency across the border in Afghanistan. The deal relieved the pressure on the army, and so, on Musharraf.

After the accord was signed on September 5, Pakistan released hundreds of tribal prisoners captured during the military campaign and returned their weapons. The militants, in turn, agreed that they would stop crossing into Afghanistan to attack coalition forces.

But far from taming cross-border violence, the truce appears to have contributed to a deterioration in the eastern Afghan border provinces of Khost, Paktia and Paktika. U.S and Afghan military officials say that the truce has made it easier for militants to operate in the region and to send weapons and fighters across the border. There have even been reports that the Taliban leader in Afghanistan, approved the peace deal. Mullah Dadullah, a Taliban commander leading the insurgency against NATO forces in the southwestern Afghan provinces of Kandahar and Helmand, told Pakistani journalists that the truce in North Waziristan had their support.

Militants have set up offices in Miramshah, the regional centre of North Waziristan, under the banner of the Department of Vice and Virtue, with the aim of curbing what they see as antisocial activities. A shura, or religious council, was created to run the regional administration and mete out justice according to a strict interpretation of Sharia. Taliban militants vowed to enforce harsh punishments for any digression and told local families to report robberies, car thefts and murders. Mosques issued warnings against any defiance.

Musharraf, however, insists that the deal has blocked Talibanisation. “There will be no Al-Qaeda activity in our tribal [area] or across the border in Afghanistan,” Musharraf declared at a joint press conference with Bush in Washington. “There will be no Taliban activity. . . . There will be no Talibanisation.”

Pervez Musharraf and George W. Bush. Photgraph: AFP

Musharraf has tried to project himself as indispensable to the west and as a man who could stop Pakistan’s drift into religious extremism. In an interview with BBC 4 radio during his visit to London, Musharraf warned that the west would be “brought to its knees” without his government’s cooperation in the so-called war on terror. “If we were not with you, you won’t be able to manage anything,” he declared.

Musharraf used the US trip to sell his book, In the Line of Fire, published by an American company, Simon & Schuster.

It is rare for a sitting head of state to publish his autobiography. The task is better left to retirement. Then why did Musharraf, under siege on every side, choose to do so? The answer is clear. He wanted to rebut his detractors: those in Pakistan who accuse him of being an American lackey, and those in the west who think he has not completely severed his ties with the militants. But his precarious balancing act has provoked more fire from all sides. His doublespeak is more apparent than ever.

Indeed, the book is a skewed interpretation of events and has predictably provoked intense controversy, both at home and abroad. Musharraf has ignited headlines all over the world with his account of his role in Pakistan’s war on terror, but he has not been telling the full story. There is a huge gap between what he professes and what he does. While speaking of his desire for eradicating religious extremism from society, he ignores his government’s continued links with Islamic extremists.

Not surprisingly, he has been accused of distorting facts to justify his various actions and policies. But the slip is too obvious. The book is too much about himself. A man of destiny, a natural leader and best soldier, he claims. This is not a modest text. The authoritarian mindset is apparent. Many revelations seem reckless. He shows no understanding of history and social dynamics — or maybe that is too much to expect from a former commando turned politician.

Hamid Karzai, Dick Cheney, George W. Bush, Condoleezza Rice and Pervez Musharraf. Photograph: AFP

Musharraf justifies the Kargil incursion, which had brought Pakistan to the brink of war with India. “Considered purely in military terms, the Kargil operations were a landmark in the history of the Pakistan army,” is Musharraf’s claim about a conflict that is generally regarded as the worst debacle in the country’s history. He insists that the ceasefire was a mistake and Pakistan was in an advantageous position to negotiate a better deal with India. He repeated his argument that India was not in a position to start an all-out war with Pakistan. Musharraf remains under the illusion that the incursion highlighted the Kashmir issue and had ultimately forced Indian leaders to come to the negotiating table. “I would like to state emphatically that whatever movement has taken place so far in the direction of finding a solution to Kashmir, is due considerably to the Kargil conflict,” he says about the military adventure, which most defence analysts agree caused a serious blow to Pakistan’s Kashmir cause.

The most controversial part of Musharraf’s book stems from his claim that after the September 11 attacks, Richard Armitage, then the US deputy secretary of state, threatened that America would bomb Pakistan “back to the Stone Age,” if Musharraf did not withdraw his support for the Taliban. The comment, according to the author, was made during a meeting with the ISI chief. “This was a shockingly barefaced threat, but it was obvious that the United States had decided to hit back , and hit back hard,” said Musharraf.

The situation became quite ugly when Armitage categorically denied having said that. ” I didn’t have the authority to make such a threat,” Armitage retorted. There is no evidence anywhere else to substantiate Musharraf’s claim. Lt. General Mahmood Ahmed met Armitage on September 12 and 13, and according to the minutes of the meeting, the tone of the US official was terse, but there was no mention of him delivering the threat. In fact, General Mahmood surprised Armitage by acceding to seven points that the US required Pakistan to comply with, which also included providing airbases for American troops to launch attacks on Afghanistan. Musharraf is also wrong when he says that he did not allow American forces to operate from Pakistani soil. Hundreds of American troops were based at Jacobabad airbase for almost 18 months after the fall of the Taliban regime. It is quite apparent that his tall claims were meant for domestic consumption, but the ploy backfired. That revelation has not appeased his critics, as some politicians and former generals reacted contemptuously, maintaining that he is Bush’s lackey.

Musharraf’s claim that he is striving to make Pakistan a moderate Muslim country received a serious blow when his government backtracked on the promise to reform the controversial Hudood laws dealing with rape and adultery, which victimise women.

Pakistani and international human rights groups have long demanded repeal of the existing laws that criminalised all extra-marital sex. A woman who fails to prove that she was raped could then be charged with adultery under the same legislation. The Hudood laws made it almost impossible to prosecute rapists. Hundreds of women are jailed every year under the notorious laws, which make a rape victim liable to prosecution for adultery if she fails to produce four male witnesses.

The government had proposed to replace the controversial laws with a new ‘Protection of Women Bill’ that placed the crime of rape within the country’s secular penal code. The bill would, for the first time, allow rapists to be tried under civil law. The move was supported by liberal political parties and women’s rights groups. But the ruling party backtracked on its promise after the MMA threatened to quit the parliament in protest. The government has also ceded to the demand by the Islamists to let the rape victims choose between either prosecuting suspects under the four-witness rule or under Pakistan’s civil penal code.

Pakistan today, appears to be in a greater political mess than when Musharraf seized power. He has delivered to the US several hundred Al-Qaeda operatives, including the masterminds of the September 11 attack. There is, however, little evidence of him showing the same kind of resolve when it comes to dealing with Islamic extremism at home. A major reason for Musharraf’s failure to root out extremism and Islamic militancy is lack of consistency in his policies.

Musharraf may have stolen the media limelight in America, but his policies have come under increasing attack, questioning his sincerity to stamping out extremism at home.