Every year in February, Orangi Town plays host to the annual congregation of the Tableeghi Jamaat for the Karachi Division. Almost a million people participate in the event — comprising speeches, sermons and prayers — which continues for three days and ends with a closing note by the head of  the Pakistan chapter, Haji Abdul Wahab, followed by a dua. The climax of the congregation sees the largest number of people in attendance.

Originally mainly a gathering of people from the Sunni Deobandi school of thought, the event has increasingly begun to attract not only people from all strata of society, but also members of proscribed jihadi and sectarian militant outfits working under new names, or under the guise of welfare organisations. At this year’s event these newer participants at the gathering set up stalls around the exit points of the ijtima gaah (place of congregation).

“I was invited by a senior colleague at the office to the Tableeghi Jamaat’s annual ijtima. He is a religious man and I was happy to notice he never spoke negatively about people from other sects. He himself took three-day leave to participate in the ijtima, and I promised him a visit on Sunday. When I visited, I was quite impressed with both, the arrangements — particularly since it was such a huge gathering — and the religious sermons I heard, which focused on people’s individual lives and the reformation of one’s self rather than on reforming others. But I was perturbed to see some of the stalls hoisting flags of banned outfits and by their loud calls for donations,” said an IT professional from a private firm as he recounted his experience at the ijtima.

He continued, “Just outside the exit point, four men were waving a flag of the Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat (ASWJ) and were asking for donations, interspersing those calls with loud anti-Shia slogans. ‘Help those who are acting against Islam’s worst enemies,’ they chanted.

“And a short distance away they had a stall, where were plastered portraits of their slain leaders: Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, Ziaur Rehman Farooqi and Azam Tariq. CDs of their hate speeches and copies of their monthly publications and other propaganda material were also being sold from their stalls.”

He said when he questioned his office colleague about this, the latter stated that the organisers of the ijtima could not stop them as they do not have the power to do so. If these outfits are banned, he contended, the police should take action against them.

Apart from the ASWJ, jihadi organisations like the Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM) and the Harkatul Mujahideen (HuM) too had stalls at the gatherings with their flags and their propaganda materials openly being sold.

“All the jihadi organisations, with the exception of the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT), are associated with the Deobandi sect. So the annual gathering here in Karachi, and the ones in other cities — the largest of these being held at Raiwind — provide a fairground for them, since people with religious leanings gather at these events in large numbers and provide a fertile arena for these organisations to disseminate their ideas and seek out potential recruitment,” maintained a security analyst who closely observes extremist activities in the country.

In her article for the Indian publication Economic and Political Weekly, (EPW), Dr Ayesha Siddiqa analysed the overall condition of society and the myriad factors that have contributed to growing radicalisation. She used the terms “latent radicalism” and “militant radicalism” to explain the process. By latent radicalism she refers to the tendencies among people to lean towards religious notions such as jihad etc. and provide a support base for militant organisations, but who do not get involved in militant activities. The militant radicals, on the other hand, she says, are receptive to radical ideas and are actively engaged in militancy.

Based on this interpretation, the relationship between the Tableeghi Jamaat and jihadi and sectarian organisations can easily be understood. Their shared roots in the orthodox Deobandi faith draw them close at the mosque and community level, with the younger adherents of the Tableeghi Jaamat who frequent religious gatherings often falling prey to the radical ideas propagated by jihadis and militant organisations who are present.

Sajid Ali, known for his out-of-the box hairstyles and his looks resembling Hollywood action star, Van Damme, was playing cricket at the club level  when a counterpart from his cricket team — a Tableeghi — started to work on him. Soon Ali began visiting the Jamaat’s Karachi Markaz in Federal B Area for weekly gatherings. Within a few months his appearance underwent a complete transformation, and he became an active member and a regular participant of the mosque-level activities of the Tableeghi Jamaat. Thereafter, he started reading books by Deobandi clerics, and learnt about the beliefs of other sects like the Barelvis, Shias and Ahmadis. His increasing interest in religious knowledge eventually led him to the literature of the Sipah Sahaba (SSP). And now, along with his participation in Tableeghi Jamaat activities, he has turned into a diehard supporter of the SSP.

“When the Sipah Sahaba was banned during the Musharraf era, many of our leaders were either arrested or martyred and some went underground. At that time I took charge of our group at the town level, and was at the forefront of collecting funds for the families of our martyrs,” Ali proudly disclosed.

As for his association with the Tableeghi Jamaat, he said, “The Tableeghi Jamaat may be a good place for self-discipline, punctuality in namaaz and other practices, but Islam is not only about preaching and routine rituals. It also asks for jihad and defence against those spreading hatred against our religion and our sacred personalities.”

He added, “Almost all the members of the Deobandi sect’s militant organisations were drawn to religion through the Tableeghi Jamaat. But soon, they began to feel restless and discontented due to the slow pace of the Jamaat’s activities. So they became part of assorted religio-political organisations or militant outfits.”

This radicalisation process was intensified in the ’90s when the Taliban were ruling Afghanistan and jihadi activities in Pakistan began to escalate. Jihadi organisations established their offices in residential localities across the country and there began a trend of civilians going for a 40-day or a four-month training regimen to the camps of jihadi organisations in the mountains of Mansehra and Azad Kashmir.

Said Azmatullah, another jihadi aspirant, “I went to the Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM) Maaskar (training camp) for 40-days training. I knew my family wouldn’t allow me to go, so I lied to them, saying I was going with the Tableeghi Jamaat to Raiwind. This my father happily allowed me to do. I was guilty for having lied, but realised when I got to the camp that I was not the only one who had resorted to lying to make my way to the camp.”

Talking about the influence of the Tableeghi Jamaat, Maulana Fazal Hakeem, a teacher at a local seminary, said,

“Visit any Deobandi madrassah and examine the students enrolled there. Most of them are either the sons or daughters of Tableeghi Jamaat members, or they have spent time in Tableeghi Jamaat activities and have decided to enrol at one of those madrassahs.”

The rise of militancy in Pakistan has drawn attention to the country’s burgeoning number of religious seminaries and their role as a recruiting ground for militant outfits, but the role of the Tableeghi Jamaat has not really been analysed. This despite the fact that the Jamaat has largely contributed, through its influence, to the increasing numbers of students of both sexes in the Deobandi seminaries, and its growing power in the traders and business communities has helped religious seminaries acquire huge donations, not only inside Pakistan, but from the overseas Pakistani communities as well.

In the post 9/11 scenario, the Tableeghi Jamaat did come under scrutiny internationally for its connection to jihadis, and was, in fact, found acting as a cover for Al-Qaeda militants who travelled in jamaat delegations to various countries. A lengthy process of scrutiny, verification and long delays in acquiring travel documents for western countries eventually forced the jamaat to shift its attention to African countries. But in Pakistan the Tableeghi Jamaat has deep-rooted support everywhere — from security institutions to political cadres and from business and traders’ communities, to the common man in almost all provinces.

In 2011, Rehman Malik, the then Federal Interior Minister was rebuked by politicians from the JUI-F, PML-Q, PML-N and even members of his own party for his remarks against the Tableeghi Jamaat at a conference on ‘Countering Extremism in South Asia’ organised by the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) in the United Kingdom.

Rehman Malik had referred to the Pakistan centre of the Tableeghi Jamaat located at Raiwind, Lahore, as a breeding and brain-washing ground where people were turned into radicals and extremists. Malik added that all the terrorists arrested in Pakistan had, among other common elements such as their own, or a close family member’s participation in the Afghan war, links to the network of over 25,000 seminaries that had mushroomed, and had invariably visited the Raiwind Tableeghi centre on several occasions.

In the wake of the widespread protest over the remarks, the Parliamentary Committee on National Security summoned Malik and he was asked to explain himself. Chairman of the committee and co-PPP stalwart, Senator Raza Rabbani, expressed his displeasure and shock over the statement, and said it had associated a “peaceful group with terrorism.”

Chief Minister Punjab Shahbaz Sharif was also quick to defend the Jamaat, and his son Hamza Shahbaz called Malik’s remarks akin to “promoting an anti-Islam agenda of imperialist forces.” PML-Q chief Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain meanwhile, warned against any evil intention towards the Raiwind centre, and Chaudhry Moonis Elahi, who was facing corruption charges, wrote an open letter condemning the anti-Jamaat statements from behind bars. In his missives to the President, Prime Minister, parliamentarians, national newspapers and TV channels, he maintained the remarks were even more painful and perturbing than being framed in a false case.

A security analyst succinctly summed up the situation. “Some politicians associating themselves with this apolitical religious organisation may be doing so for religious sentiments, but keeping in mind the widespread support the Tableeghi Jamaat enjoys across Pakistan, perhaps their loyalty owes to potential gains as well,” he said. “And what is really interesting,” he added, “is the presence of ex-servicemen in their ranks, who can use the Jamaat for their respective political agendas.”

In 2003, the Tableeghi Jamat had a purge in its ranks. Two groups had emerged; both had former military officers supporting them. It all started when a section of the Jamaat’s associates introduced practices opposed to the famous six principles adopted during the early days of the Jamaat’s existence, which became standard practice around the globe. The moves to change were resisted, and it was former Intelligence Chief, General Javed Nasir, who played a major role in evicting the troublemakers. Two of them, ex-servicemen Colonel Taj Afsar and Major Imtiaz were expelled, and their group’s activities at Ibraheem Masjid in Lahore, which was being used as a parallel centre to the main Raiwind Markaz, were barred.

But there have been other causes of friction between assorted members of the religious right. Pakistani political Islamists and jihadis have had several disagreements with the Tableeghis. Political Islamists have always complained that the Tableeghis focus on individual piety, but there is a lack of emphasis on following other religious injunctions, such as using their votes or raising their voices against social injustice. For their part, the jihadis complain that the Tableeghis misinterpretation of texts from the holy books, especially in reference to armed struggle, has undermined the cause of jihad.

These differences have made the Tableeghis a target of many terrorist attacks. Tableeghi centres in Swat, Peshawar and Quetta have been attacked by terrorists. And in Swat, the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) faction led by Fazlullah was very critical of the Tableeghi Jamaat for not supporting its activities. The Tableeghi Markaz in Swat was even captured at the height of TTP power in Swat and the activities of the group halted.

It is true that the Tableeghi Jamaat elders rarely talk about militant activities and terrorism in the name of Islam. The old generation of Tableeghis in fact, criticise the jihadis for their activities, which they contend have made it difficult for them to acquire travel documents for the delegations that want to travel to western countries. The younger Tableeghis, however, may be more inclined to support militant organisations — as a young Tableeghi prayer leader’s sermon in his dua after the Eid prayers demonstrated. He said, “May God help all those organisations who are serving Islam, either by Tableeghi Jamaat activities, or by armed resistance against the enemies of Islam.”

Then he asked namaazis to donate generously to the members of a jihadi outfit who waited outside the mosque.

This article was originally published in Newsline’s August 2015 issue.