After many months of buildup — mainly through aerial bombardment and US Predator drone attacks — the Pakistan Army began a ground operation to reclaim South Waziristan from the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and foreign militants. The operation in South Waziristan will be tougher and bloodier than the one in Swat. But victory is possible.

The approaching winter, which will be most severe towards the end of December, is expected to be the biggest hurdle in the army’s way. A month-and-a-half is not considered sufficient time to defeat the entrenched fighters of the TTP. It is possible, though, that the harsh conditions may be to the army’s benefit. For over two decades, until a ceasefire was negotiated in 2003, Pakistan’s troops had been fighting the Indians to a standstill in Siachen. The topography and weather of Siachen is like South Waziristan on steroids and the experience should give an advantage to the army.

If, as is probable, the operation stretches into 2010, there will be significant casualties — on both sides. Patience will be paramount. This is where the civilian and military leaderships must learn from the failure of previous operations in South Waziristan. In 2004, with 7,000 troops (one-fourth of the current military presence), the army was able to make significant inroads against the TTP. What they could not do was prevent the militants from blending with the local population and carrying out periodic surprise raids on the army. The TTP will repeat the same tactics and hope, as in 2004, that the government gets frustrated and agrees to a peace deal. Just last year, after 12 days of the horribly named Operation Zalzala (earthquake), the army leadership gave up and signed another doomed accord with the TTP. The failure of past agreements should forestall a repeat occurrence.

It is very likely, in fact, that the TTP has already melted into the civilian population to seek refuge from the regular air strikes. This will make it easier to claim territory but multiply the difficulty in capturing militants and preventing ambushes. The TTP may also have moved to the mountains to further inconvenience the army. While the TTP will have the benefit of familiarity in the mountainous terrain, the army should have combat advantage in such conditions thanks to its Siachen experience.

Even if the army is successful in taking South Waziristan, it will need to occupy the territory for an indefinite period. The moral necessity of giving civilians time to flee the area has also allowed Taliban fighters to seek refuge in safer environs. If the army leaves or significantly reduces its strength, it is certain that the TTP will move right back in.