On Sunday, there were two articles that made international headlines about Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal.

One asked, “In an unstable Pakistan, can nuclear warheads be kept safe?”

The other answered, “Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are safe, for now.”

It was a convenient and brief discussion between two separate news outlets. The first article received far more attention, though. It wasn’t more controversial because it asked a question, leaving doubt. It was more controversial because of the claims it made: the biggest one being that “current and former officials said in interviews in Washington and Pakistan that [the Obama] administration has been negotiating highly sensitive understandings with the Pakistani military. These would allow specially trained American units to provide added security for the Pakistani arsenal in case of a crisis.”

Unsurprisingly, this was big news here in Pakistan. The fact that it was published in The New Yorker, gives it automatic credibility. For many, the fact that it was written by well-known investigative journalist Seymour Hersh also gives the story punch. Though, others would disagree: Hersh has his detractors.

But is the alleged arrangement so outlandish? In a crisis, despite the never-ending issue of sovereignty, wouldn’t Pakistan want help to prevent the unthinkable? It is easy to imagine that the US would want an agreement like this anyway. Every time there is a major attack in Pakistan, US commentators (usually on Fox News) start debating nightmare scenarios. They were even in top gear on this issue after the assassination of Benazir Bhutto. US politicians are no different; Pakistan is a grave worry for many. Sadly, from America’s shores, Pakistan is generally seen as fragile and filled with incompetence.

Brigadier (retired) Naeem Salik, while being interviewed on a Pakistani televison news programme, said the US not only had its own rogue elements to worry about but also that US politicians are paranoid and believe Pakistan’s nuclear warheads are “lying on the side of the road waiting for militants to come along and carry them a way in a sack.” Brigadier Salik insinuated that information like the kind Hersh receives is fed from rogue US officials (inside intelligence agencies such as the CIA and government wings such as the state department) in order to keep pressure on the Pakistan government to not let up in the fight against militants.

The second article was from Reuters. And while it may have provided a generally positive conclusion to the question of the safety of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, it also hammered in the risks that prevailed. The author, Myra MacDonald, quotes a professor from the University of Bradford (perhaps thinking someone associated with “Brad-istan” would add credibility. “I don’t think it is realistic anymore to say there is no threat to these weapons, that they are totally safe,” said Professor Shaun Gregory. MacDonald then lays out what could happen:

The nightmare scenario would be of militants using a suicide bombing as a diversionary tactic in order to send in a team of commandos – similar to those who attacked the Pakistan Army’s own headquarters last month in the city of Rawalpindi.

Then, and given the secrecy surrounding Pakistan’s nuclear program this would need collusion and information from inside, they would try to grab fissile material for a nuclear bomb.

See how she slyly worked in the idea of Taliban sympathisers within the military without saying they actually exist? Her final point is that a nuclear breach is possible, but the chances of success are slim: staging an attack, locating the fissile material and transporting it safely to their final destination will be next to impossible for the militants.

Though the political situation is always changing, MacDonald’s conclusions seem sound, for now.